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Abstract 
The article explores capital theory, examining the typology of forms of capital possessed 
by elite directors, and drawing in particular on the writings of Pierre Bourdieu. We are 
particularly interested in questions relating to the reproduction and regeneration of 
business elites. How do business elites reproduce and regenerate themselves, despite the 
fact that their membership is constantly changing? What qualifies someone for 
membership of an elite business group, and how do newcomers gain acceptance? We 
focus here on some of the ‘newcomers’ who participated in our study of French and 
British business elites (1998-2003), interviews with whom allow us to interpret the 
experience of those who have gained admission to elite business groups. We find that 
culture plays a critical role, imposing discipline and compliance to the rules of the 
organisational game, as individuals act along pre-ordained lines laid down by ‘habitus’. 
Our research points overwhelmingly to the power of cultural reproduction among 
business elites, despite the admission of newcomers to the boards of the leading 
companies of Britain and France, or of nouveaux riches into ‘old guard’ elite 
communities. 
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Introduction 
‘Capital’, wrote Pierre Bourdieu, ‘represents a power over the field… The kinds of 
capital, like aces in a game of cards, are powers that define the chances of profit in a 
particular field…’ (1985: 724). For Bourdieu (1986b), capital is a generalised resource, 
which may be monetary or non-monetary in form, tangible or intangible. The four aces in 
the pack of cards to which Bourdieu refers are economic, cultural, social and symbolic 
capital (1986b). The power that these afford, however, is not stable and static; capital 
formation is an on-going, dynamic process, subject to accumulation or attrition. Like a 
game of cards, the hand which players are dealt must still be played – with greater or 
lesser skill, and to greater or lesser effect. Some individuals are endowed with 
significantly better life chances than others; though the patterns of social class formation 
are looser in present times than in the past, economic class divisions continue to exercise 
a considerable impact on life chances (Scott 2002). That said, none of this is entirely 
deterministic. Human agency and responsibility continue to matter – career success is not 
preordained; though successful people still use their allotted capital to best effect, as 
Laird (2006) amply demonstrates. One condition of success, however, according to 
Bourdieu (1991), for all those who are privileged to play is investment in the game itself, 
a recognition that the game, a priori, is worth playing. This unspoken contract unites all 
participants, fundamentally committed to and respectful of the game and its stakes. 
The purpose of this article is twofold. On the one hand, it explores capital theory, 
studying the typology of forms of capital possessed by elite directors, drawing in 
particular on the work of Pierre Bourdieu. On the other, it examines the dynamics of elite 
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business networking by directors in Britain and France. Bourdieu’s ideas on capital 
theory are brought to life by empirical data from a comparative study on business elites in 
both countries. We are particularly interested in questions related to the reproduction and 
regeneration of business elites. How do business elites reproduce and regenerate 
themselves, in spite of the fact that their membership is constantly changing? What 
qualifies someone for membership of an elite business group, and how do newcomers 
gain acceptance? How does an ambitious individual acquire and display the capabilities 
and behavioural characteristics that mark him or her out as suitable material for 
recruitment? We focus here on some of the newcomers who were part of our study of 
French and British business elites (1998-2003), interviews with whom shed light on the 
experience of those who have gained admission to elite business groups. Elite 
organisation and networking remain very different in the two countries. Our research 
points overwhelmingly to the strength of cultural reproduction among business elites, 
including at board level, despite the regular admission of newcomers to the boards of the 
leading companies of Britain and France, or of nouveaux riches into the ‘old guard’ 
business elite communities. 
 
The Research 
The research on which this article is based stems from a longitudinal, cross-nationally 
comparative study on business elites and corporate governance in Britain and France 
(Maclean et al. 2006; 2007). The project has been conducted by the authors since 1999, 
and consists of four related sub-projects: first, a study of the institutional histories of the 
top 100 companies in 1998 in France and the UK respectively; second, a 
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prosopographical study or ‘collective biography’ of 2,291 directors of the top 100 French 
and UK companies, examining their education, qualifications, careers, networks, roles 
and responsibilities; third, an in-depth study of the social backgrounds and 
accomplishments of the top 100 most powerful directors in France and the UK 
respectively, the ‘super elite’, analysing their social origins and career trajectories; and 
fourth, a study of the social reality of business elites based upon a set of semi-structured 
interviews with past and present business leaders in France and the UK. A ‘census date’ 
of 1 January 1998 was selected to ascertain organisational and individual membership of 
the corporate elites of France and the UK. The study period covers the years 1998 to 
2003 inclusive: a length of time considered sufficiently long to reveal patterns and trends, 
but sufficiently short to constitute a distinct historical period. Data were gathered from a 
wide range of publicly available sources on each of the directors identified as belonging 
to the business elites of France and the UK in 1998, including annual reports and 
accounts of French and UK companies for the years 1997 to 2004 inclusive, Datamonitor 
company reports, Le Guide des Etats Majors des Grandes Entreprises for 1998-2004 
inclusive, Who’s Who in France and the UK, and Hemscott Company Guru Academic 
director profiles. 
 
Bourdieu’s Concept of Capital 
Bourdieu’s concept of capital is intimately related to his concept of field (champ), 
defined by DiMaggio and Powell as a ‘totality of relevant actors’ (1991: 65) which 
together comprise ‘a recognized area of institutional life’ (1991: 64). Bourdieu depicts 
modern society as highly differentiated and stratified, marked by specialisation and the 
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progressive splitting of fields into sub-fields, resulting in an order distinguished by a 
complex configuration of interweaving fields, ‘differentiated social microcosms 
operating as spaces of objective forces and arenas of struggle … which refract and 
transmute external determinations and interests’ (Calhoun and Wacquant 2002: 6). Fields 
are characterised by an on-going struggle for capital, as struggles over access or stakes 
ensue within structured systems of social relations (Oakes et al. 1998; Wacquant, 1989). 
Stratification arises in fields because actors possess different amounts of capital. In the 
UK, for example, general practitioners have arguably enjoyed greater success in their 
struggle for resources than schoolteachers, faced with recent government reform agendas, 
for reasons which have to do with their respective locations in the field of professions 
(Loughlin and Broadbent 1996). 
Domination within any field or sub-field is contingent on possessing the right 
quantities and combinations of economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital. At the 
same time, homologies exist between fields that lead dominant actors to share similar 
dispositions across domains, so that structurally equivalent actors may be substitutable to 
a degree (Anheier et al. 1995; Bourdieu 1986a). Members of the elite within any field are 
capital rich, and can apply this in a variety of ways to maintain their dominant position. 
In this way, they reap the rewards of capital accumulation, control, legitimacy and 
distinction. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
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To some extent, the various types of capital – economic, cultural, social and 
symbolic (see Figure 1) – are transmutable, though they differ in their liquidity: the 
extent to which they may be converted into other types of capital, as well as the extent to 
which they are prone to erosion or inflation. Economic capital, for example, may be used 
to purchase cultural capital, in the form of an education at a prestigious establishment, 
while educational credentials in the form of qualifications may be converted in turn into a 
lucrative appointment. As Bourdieu explains, ‘the volume of cultural capital…determines 
the aggregate chances of profit in all games in which cultural capital is effective, thereby 
helping to determine positions in the social space’ (1985: 724). The conversion of 
economic to cultural capital, however, cannot be taken for granted. The nouveaux riches 
are often rich in economic capital, but lacking in cultural capital (Anheier et al. 1995; 
Crook, 1999). As one interviewee, who came from a ‘very poor’ background, lamented, 
this deficit is not necessarily something which can be made up retrospectively:  
 
I think I was better prepared as a 17-year-old coming from that background than 
any public school kid, who doesn’t figure it out until he’s 25. What you don’t 
have is the education. The thing I most regret is that I was never given a French 
lesson. If I could speak four or five languages… the opportunities are so great. 
I’m lucky that I’m in the television business, which is predominantly English, but 
I have friends who can speak four or five languages in any accent, and it is a huge 
advantage.1  
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The elite member concerned pulled himself up by the bootstraps to become the 
founder of a leading international entertainment company, accumulating considerable 
wealth, and the trappings of wealth, in the process (the interview was held at a 
gentleman’s club). He makes an important point when he highlights the importance of 
language: power and domination are linked to language (Oakes et al. 1998). That 
linguistic capital, the way one speaks, is inseparably bound up with economic capital is 
something of which Bourdieu, hailing from southwestern France with its pronounced, 
provincial accent, was fully aware (1977b). Bourdieu (1991) warns us to be wary of 
language and the power of words, recognising that whilst words may be ostensibly 
neutral in themselves, they are nevertheless used for symbolic profit. However, words do 
not reflect reality; rather, they are bound up with ritual, culture, convention, and hence 
class, and are instead ‘an agreed way of speaking and carrying out activities’ (Oakes et al. 
1998: 257).  
Cultural capital, in the form, say, of attendance at a good school, converts 
relatively easily into social capital, as scholarship children attending elite British public 
schools might appreciate – including one interviewee, who at age ten won a scholarship 
to Bromsgrove School, and later a Royal Navy scholarship to University College London. 
This interviewee went on to enjoy an illustrious career in law and business, heading a 
national business association, and subsequently attracting multiple, lucrative 
directorships. He believes Britain has become more of a meritocracy than previously, 
claiming: ‘I am very proud of Britain in rising to the top. It has become less of a “who 
you know” and more of a meritocracy. It matters not where you went to school, it really 
does not matter as long as you are good enough’.2 Belief in the meritocracy confirms and 
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credits individual success, a point stressed by Laird (2006: 11): ‘Biographies of the 
successful…follow this pattern, replete with details of social factors, but crediting 
individual factors nonetheless’. This strikes a chord with France, a nation ostensibly built 
on a meritocracy, having rid itself more than two centuries ago of a hated monarchy and 
aristocracy.  
To credit individual agency without taking full account of social and family 
factors, however, amounts to misrecognition (Bourdieu 1986a; 1996; Bubolz 2001). 
Many of our French interviewees stressed the humble nature of their origins, described on 
occasion as ‘très modeste’; on enquiring further, these regularly emerged as less lowly. In 
one interview, a ‘very modest’ background turned out to imply a father who headed a 
company, and a mother who owned a vineyard and ran an agricultural business.3 In fact, 
our study of the social backgrounds of French directors found these to be drawn 
proportionately more from the upper and upper-middle classes than the British cohort, 
with 76.59 per cent of French directors belonging to these categories, as against 63.74 of 
British directors. Just over 4 per cent of French directors came from the lower classes, 
compared to almost 11 per cent of British directors (Maclean et al. 2006). It is extremely 
rare to find, in the pages of Who’s Who in France, a company director whose father is 
described as working class (ouvrier). 
At interview, however, some French business leaders struck an overt populist 
tone, one director of a leading cosmetics company explaining that his passion was 
football, though he also played polo: ‘I play football, which is the most popular sport. 
And I play polo which is the most elitist’.4 While social class patterns are more 
indeterminate than in the past, as noted, Bourdieu nevertheless describes this type of 
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dichotomy as a ‘condescension strategy’, occurring when ‘the person “naturally” 
associated with a Rolls Royce, a top hat or golf… takes the metro, sports a flat cap…or 
plays football’ (1986a: 472), thereby focusing attention on the gap between the two 
activities.  
Symbolic capital, in the form of titles and reputation, is arguably less liquid and 
harder to acquire than cultural capital. This point was highlighted in the UK by the ‘cash 
for honours’ scandal, which blighted Tony Blair’s final year as premier, allegedly 
proposing an exchange of economic for symbolic capital, circumventing in the process 
the conventional channels of capital accumulation and conversion. Distinction, however, 
requires legitimacy in order to have power (Bourdieu 1986a; 1994). The affair 
emphasises the importance of the appearance of disinterestedness. Symbolic capital 
demands subtlety as part of the modus operandi of capital conversion: the link between 
alleged loans to political parties and proposed peerages was arguably too evident. A 
strategy, to be effective, should appear to be ‘on the hither side of all calculation’ 
(Bourdieu 1977a: 214; Swartz 1997: 70). The affair also sheds light on one of the key 
differences between senior elite members and newcomers or challengers. In Britain and 
also, to a lesser extent, in France, the honours system has the special function of 
legitimising the right of the elite to rule.5 Symbolic power works primarily through a 
mechanism of naming and categorisation (Oakes et al. 1998). Challengers to the ‘old 
guard’, like the nouveaux riches of the Victorian and Edwardian eras (Crook 1999), may 
lack (and therefore crave) the symbolic capital, in the form of titles and honours, which 
would cement, confirm and authenticate their arrival among the ‘true’ elite.  
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One feature which may distinguish the ‘new elite’ from the ‘old guard’ is the 
potential capacity for the former to exercise greater reflexivity. Lacking the 
‘unselfconscious belonging of those born to wealth, cultural pedigree and elite accents’ 
(Calhoun and Wacquant 2002: 2), they have greater opportunity for, and arguably need 
of, more self-conscious reflection on the practices of business elites (Bourdieu 1977a; 
1990a; 1990b; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). This is important in acquiring and 
demonstrating the personal dispositions and behaviours needed to function effectively 
alongside others in a strategic leadership role. Cultural practices are essentially reflective 
of deep-rooted class distinctions, while lifestyles give practical expression to the 
symbolic dimension of class identity. A practice approach therefore suggests paying close 
attention to accents, gestures, expressions and habits normally acquired unconsciously 
through being immersed in a community or environment (Chia and MacKay 2007). Such 
self-awareness is exhibited by one French CEO, who speaks poignantly of how the 
military uniform worn at the elite grande école where he studied, Ecole Polytechnique, 
helped to iron out the sense of difference he felt as a southerner:  
 
I remember that in my younger days, wearing the school’s uniform meant a lot to 
me. For the young man coming from Nice (in the South of France) that I was, it 
was a way to erase all the differences that existed between students coming up 
from the provinces and those brought up in the prestigious Parisian preparatory 
courses, such as the Lycée Louis-le-Grand.6 
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Of course, much of human behaviour is the product not of conscious decisions, 
but of ‘habitus’, the ingrained and socially constituted dispositions of social classes that 
lead actors to make choices and decisions that reproduce existing social structures and 
status distinctions. ‘Habitus’ is defined by Bourdieu as ‘structured structures predisposed 
to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize 
practices and representations’ (1990a: 53). It is the means by which life chances are 
‘internalized and converted into a disposition’ (Bourdieu 1986a: 170), and is thus 
primarily a mechanism for social reproduction. Habitus serves as a binding force between 
various fractions within a class, leading to common though not orchestrated action on the 
basis of categories of ‘perception and appreciation’ (Bourdieu 1986a: 171). In this way, it 
reconciles the co-existence of subjective and objective conditions within society.  
The objective conditions of existence include the consumption of goods, which 
may be valued more for their social meaning than for their functional use (Solomon 
1983). A reflexive practice, therefore, is not just a mode of being-in-the world but 
includes a relationship with products and things – emblems, and lesser emblems, of 
distinction – indicative of choices and preferences. Le Wita (1994: 141) argues that 
‘trivia … have a particular function, namely to create distinction’, a view shared by 
Bourdieu: ‘Taste’, he points out, ‘classifies, and it classifies the classifier’ (1986a: 6). 
Tastes originate not from internally generated artistic preferences, but from the socially 
conditioning effect of habitus and the availability of economic and cultural capital. 
Ultimately, in Bourdieu’s view, the exercise of taste confirms the right to rule. The 
practical value of Bourdieu’s thinking thus stems from the insight that those who advance 
in society into elite positions do so both by consciously acquiring personal capital 
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(qualifications, experience, connections and goods) and by unconsciously assimilating 
knowledge and dispositions through habitus. 
Ambitious newcomers arguably require, therefore, as suggested, greater self-
consciousness in their efforts to acquire a ‘feel for the game’ in their new environment. 
One elite member, who claimed to come from humble origins, explained at interview, in 
minute detail, how he painstakingly acquired the dispositions necessary for membership 
of an elite business group. He did so by closely observing his father-in-law, a member of 
minor Scottish aristocracy, copying his habits and practices, paying acute attention to 
details, from the cutlery he used to the wine he ordered, to the pursuits of shooting and 
golf in which he engaged. He recognised the importance of speech – as he put it, ‘the 
Scots are “pigeon-hole people”: because I didn’t have a Scottish accent they didn’t know 
that I was not well born’ – and strove to emulate the accent of the class into which he was 
marrying.7  
Reflexive practice arguably includes marriage, viewed by Bourdieu (1972) as a 
strategy, fundamental to the perpetuation (or in the above case acquisition) of economic 
power on the part of business elites, though at times functioning more subconsciously 
than consciously. Hall and de Bettignies (1968), who established the occupations of 
fathers-in-law of their sample of French business leaders, found that marriage in the 
1960s was very much an ‘intra-class affair’, with 75 per cent of their sample having 
wives belonging to the same social class. Our own research confirms the popularity of 
marriage amongst contemporary business elites, with almost all of the top 100 super elite 
in both countries having married, and just two elite directors from each cohort remaining 
single. The mean number of children of top 100 French and British directors was 2.9 and 
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2.4 respectively, above the national average in both cases. The impression of 
conventionality and family stability is reinforced by a lower than average divorce rate of 
just seven per cent among top French directors and 11 per cent among the British. In both 
countries nearly all the divorcees married again. The implication is that the symbols and 
rituals of married life – emphasising constancy, reliability and a belief in family values – 
are seen in themselves to bear witness to the fitness of a person to hold high office in 
business; as one leading British CEO expressed it: ‘I’m married with three children and 
am dog-thoroughly boring’.8 
 
The Power of Social Capital 
One of the most important ‘aces’ in the game is social capital, defined as the resources 
that inhere in the structure of relationships between actors (Bourdieu 1986b; Coleman 
1988; Burt 1992; 1997; Burt et al. 2000; Oh et al. 2004), or the ‘sum of the actual and 
potential resources that can be mobilized through membership in social networks of 
actors and organizations’ (Anheier et al. 1995: 862). 
It is social capital that determines who advances in business and who does not 
(Finkelstein et al. 2007: 112-120). The distinction between membership and non-
membership, inclusion and exclusion, is critical (Bourdieu 1986a: 476). Discrimination, 
Laird insists, is two-way, pulling in and pushing out, such that no one makes it entirely 
on his or her own: ‘what the rare rags-to-riches story and all success stories prove is 
another rule, one to which there is no exception: that of the necessity for connections and 
connectability – the rule of social capital’ (2006: 1-2). Even Andrew Carnegie, perhaps 
the most celebrated American rags-to-riches story, would not have enjoyed such 
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prodigious success, she argues, without the invaluable assistance provided at the start of 
his career first by his uncle and then by his mentor, Tom Scott. Laird shows how this 
applies equally to the other ostensibly ‘self-made’ men included in her investigation, such 
as Benjamin Franklin, Bill Gates, J.P. Morgan and Thomas Mellon, pinpointing the social 
connections – the networks, mentors, role models and gatekeepers – that helped them to 
climb the ladder.   
Many elite members who participated in this study illustrated the potency of 
social capital from their own, individual perspectives. One interviewee, the Chairman and 
non-executive director of several public limited companies, including a major 
international bank, spoke candidly at interview of the individuals who had facilitated his 
success, acting as beacons of his career. These included Sir William Hayter, Warden of 
New College, Oxford, who urged him not to go into the Foreign Office, and later Jimmy 
Goldsmith, described as an ‘unconventional thinker’ and a ‘brilliant gambler’, who taught 
him ‘to think outside the box’.9 Another interviewee, who rose to head the European 
operation of a global IT company, attributed his success first to the foresight of his 
working-class parents in sending him to university – ‘My father was a porter and my 
mother was a waitress. To the great credit of my parents, they believed their children 
should go to university… and their attitude was very much that you could achieve what 
you wanted to’ – and second to his closest friend at university, with whom he formed a 
company, selling up in the early 1990s for a sum that meant neither of them would ever 
need to work again.10 Another, unable, as he put it, ‘with my sort of background to get in 
the front door to the BBC’, or any of the major studios, required the connections of his 
father-in-law to find a way into television.11 Yet another, who won a scholarship to 
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independent school, spoke warmly of the help given him by his primary school 
headmaster:  
 
A headmaster at my state primary school, who clearly thought his job was to 
equip you for life, not just for exams, started me on this road of enormous love for 
history and our role in the world. He used to say to me, at age seven or eight, 
never be frightened of asking why, and never pretend that you know when you 
don’t. I can remember him standing there and saying so. I have never forgotten 
him. He put me through three exams for a scholarship when I was ten and a half, 
one was for the local grammar school, the second one was for King Edward 
School, and the third one was for Bromsgrove School. I got them all.12 
 
The Dynamics of Elite Business Networking in Britain and France 
Few studies of the ties that bind elite business members (Palmer et al. 1986) are cross-
national and comparative (Hughes et al. 1977; Useem 1982; Scott 1991; Burt et al. 2000; 
Maclean et al., 2006). One key insight gleaned from the present study is the finding that 
elite networking by directors is achieved very differently in France and the UK. While 
the ties that bind the French business elite tend to be institutional and strong, sustained 
and supported by the state, those that unite the business elite in Britain are in part social 
in nature and tend to be relatively weak. In this they conform more closely to 
Granovetter’s notion of weak ties (1973) than the tightly networked French business 
system. The French cohort displays a propensity towards more endogenous ties, while 
their British counterparts appear more willing to engage in more diverse, heterogeneous 
 16 
relationships. In France, networking is found to be an institutional feature, systemically 
embedded, whereas in the UK the onus is not on institutions but on individuals. The latter 
is more haphazard, relying largely on the social ambition and networking skills of 
aspiring individuals, often through sport or arts charities.  
In fact, our research found that British directors were almost twice as likely to be 
involved with sports or arts institutions, displaying a participation rate of 28 per cent as 
against 15 per cent for the French group. Elite British directors are also more than four 
times as likely to engage in charitable work as French directors (Maclean et al. 2006). 
One interviewee, indeed, who grew up on a tough housing estate in West Yorkshire, and 
was given his first pair of shoes by a charity, points to the importance of knowing what it 
feels like to be the beneficiary of charity, a rarity among elite directors: ‘I’d rather take a 
child and teach them something; don’t give the third world money, give them help’.13 By 
contrast, French directors were more likely to serve on the boards of business 
associations, which tend to attract similar types of individual. One interviewee, the 
Human Resource Director for Europe of a world leader in industrial gases, explained how 
he had developed together with four colleagues a network of 15-20 international human 
resource directors across Paris, called the HR Exchange.14  
Strong ties, as Granovetter (1973) observed, are more likely to induce conformity, 
exposing participants to richer but less diverse information. The French cohort displays a 
propensity towards more endogenous ties, corresponding in this way to a ‘bonding’ social 
capital perspective. French business, political and administrative elites share a common 
education, fostering local cohesion (Kadushin 1995; Maclean 2002; Maclean et al. 2006). 
They are helped in this by the compact size of the French business elite, facilitating 
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relationships amongst them. The numbers graduating each year from an elite grande 
école such as Polytechnique, for example, are far smaller than those that graduate each 
year from Oxford or Cambridge. British directors, on the other hand, appear more willing 
to engage in more diverse relationships with a variety of external constituencies, more 
typical of ‘bridging’ social capital (Adler and Kwon 2002; Burt 1992; 1997; Geletkanycz 
and Hambrick 1997). Such relationships are more likely to bridge ‘structural holes’, 
defined by Burt as the ‘disconnections between nonredundant contacts in a network’ 
(1997: 339). One French CEO of a leading international financial company, who lives 
and works in both Paris and London, stressed the importance to British business elites of 
a social life, in contrast to which French elites value their privacy:  
 
People in the UK find a social life is very important to them. In France people feel 
that private life is private life. Of course, there are those who break the rule, but 
even the CEOs of big companies like to have a private life. When you’re not 
working you go to the movies or a restaurant and don’t have your weekend 
interrupted by a business relation.15  
 
The state-sponsored nature of networking among the French business elite was 
amply illustrated by the same CEO, who spoke openly at interview of useful relationships 
gleaned from his days at the Ecole Nationale d’Administration (ENA), a leading grande 
école, which later revolved around the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury, forming a 
cohesive subgroup of relations: 
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To be frank, it is more a subset, because the classes at ENA consisted of around 
140 people. Some people go to the Foreign Office and some to the Health 
Ministry. You may know them personally, but you don’t have business directly 
with them. So the subset was more being able to go to the Minister of Finance at 
the Treasury and meet people there, and the Treasury is traditionally (as I believe 
in the UK) a very active part of the Finance Ministry. At that time, people didn’t 
stay in the Treasury for life. After civil service school you would stay in the 
Ministry of Finance for six or seven years, so repaying your debt for studies to the 
French State. Then people would stay in the Treasury for 10 to 15 years…. The 
CEO of Suez was in the Treasury. The CEO of Renault was in the Budget and 
Ministry of Finance at the time. The Head of the French Banking Federation was 
at the French Treasury at the same time as me. This must have been around 
1974… I suppose I have a kind of network in the world. Knowing people makes it 
easier to deal with people, because knowing them personally means I can call 
them.16  
 
Our research found that 49 per cent of elite French directors in 1998 had moved 
from the public to the private sector, beginning their career, as this CEO did, working for 
the state. Indeed, the grandes écoles in France have a state-serving ethos, several of them 
having been established in revolutionary times, or later under Napoleon, specifically to 
provide the trained elite administrators and teachers needed to serve the state. This notion 
of the state as a sponsor and facilitator of elite ties is not encountered in the UK (Bauer 
and Bertin-Mourot 1996). Just 3 per cent of top British directors began their careers in the 
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public sector (Maclean et al. 2006). Like the prestigious grandes écoles, the grands 
corps, the pinnacle of France’s civil service elite, foster an esprit de caste, resembling 
forms of extended family, freemasonry or ‘placement bureaux’ (Barsoux and Lawrence 
1990; Marceau 1989; Suleiman 1978: 197). The grands corps consecrate social identities 
that are both in competition and complementary, such that, despite the rivalry that exists 
between individual corps, all corpsards are ‘united by a genuine organic solidarity’ 
(Bourdieu 1994: 142).  
In his study of the French financial elite in the early 1990s, Kadushin (1995) 
found that elite members serving as directors on multiple boards were more likely to have 
attended the ‘right’ schools, and to be members of the ‘right’ clubs. Such schools and 
clubs, often endowed with a political dimension, function as policy circles, and come to 
serve as ‘proxies’ for membership of the upper social classes. Elite clubs frequented by 
leading French directors in our study include the Association du Siècle, Maxim’s 
Business Club, the Racing Club of Paris, Polo de Paris, the Cercle du Bois de Boulogne, 
Entreprise et Cité and the Club des 100. What this commonality of membership gives 
elite French directors above all is a high degree of ‘enforceable trust’ (Kadushin 1995: 
219). As Portes and Sensenbrenner explain, this is the means by which ‘social capital is 
generated by individual members’ disciplined compliance with group expectations’. In 
this it resembles reciprocity exchanges, except that ‘the actor’s behaviour is not oriented 
to a particular other but to the web of social networks of the entire community’ (1993: 
1325). Trust therefore serves as an ‘expectational asset’ (Knez and Camerer 1994), 
cementing relationships and building confident expectations regarding the future, 
inducing optimism among the business elite (De Carolis and Saparito 2006).  
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Meanwhile, more that half of Britain’s top 100 directors in 1998, 54 in all, 
belonged to a London club, many located in and around Pall Mall, including the 
Athenaeum, Brooks’s and the RAC. Many more were members of elite sport clubs, with 
golf the most popular sporting club to join, one fifth of the British super elite being 
members of a golf club. This is in stark contrast to French directors. As one French CEO 
put it: ‘The only thing you might get in France is tennis’. In declining invitations from 
British elites to go hunting or fishing, this particular CEO felt quite clearly that he had 
missed a connection: ‘I’ve been invited to go shooting, but say, “No, I don’t know how to 
shoot”, and you see very clearly that you’ve missed some connection. It’s the same with 
fishing’.17 From the personal accounts of top executives interviewed as part of our study, 
it is difficult to overestimate the importance of sport in the British context. One British 
CEO (whose father worked as a school janitor) cited sport as one of the main reasons 
why he had risen so swiftly up the corporate ladder, telling of a cricket match he had 
played in at the start of his career, when his company’s cricket team had thrashed that of 
a leading high street bank:  
 
 We sat down in the changing room afterwards and we suddenly realised that we 
had 10 internationals, nine full county players, and six blues. I’d only been in the 
company six months and saw what a company I’d joined. Ever since that day I’ve 
always known that it wouldn’t matter what challenge was set. I could turn out an 
orchestra tomorrow, a football team, a rugby team, a cricket team, and we’d take 
anybody on.18 
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For ambitious British executives, sport serves as a proving ground, a means of 
building personal confidence. It provides a mechanism for social bonding and the 
development of solidarity between individuals. And, perhaps most tellingly of all, it is an 
enduring source of personal distinction. The popularity of exclusive clubs, sporting and 
social, among the British super elite underlines the social nature of many of the ties that 
enable the British super elite to connect. Major sporting events such as tennis at 
Wimbledon, racing at Ascot, the Henley regatta and sailing at Cowes provide likewise 
symbolically loaded opportunities for elite networking.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The notion that membership of a social institution or institutions can serve unconsciously 
to form the potentialities of an individual actor is an important one, implying that the life 
chances of individuals are forged uniquely, and in no small way, through their 
membership of a series of institutions, of which family, educational institutions, and 
corporate and professional organisations and associations are among the most 
fundamental. Boards also serve as structuring structures for the power elite of corporate 
capitalism, being essentially small, elite communities which function in accordance with 
established norms and cultural practices, requiring conformity of behaviour from the 
individuals who serve on them. In France, the state arguably serves as a further 
structuring structure, though this does not apply to anywhere near the same degree in the 
UK (Bauer and Bertin-Mourot 1996). It is by getting the most out of membership of 
families, educational institutions and corporate and professional organisations that 
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individuals add to their stock of capital, and position themselves for recruitment into the 
corporate elite (Bubolz 2001). 
 It is also clear from our research that in both Britain and France there is a strong 
tendency towards cultural reproduction, inducing continuity without preventing change. 
We have been struck continually by the power of cultural reproduction in organisations, 
the reassertion of social and cultural patterns, often in the face of apparent change. 
Culture is the product and assimilation of lived experience, imposing discipline and 
compliance to the rules of the organisational game. It is manifest in, and generated by, 
practice. Change, on the other hand, may be misrecognised and exaggerated, partly 
because it is typically superficial, not structural. This chimes with the explanation offered 
by Bourdieu (1986a), who argues that the deep-rooted and socially constructed 
dispositions of classes induce actors to make choices and decisions which reinforce in 
turn pre-existing social structures and status distinctions. A board is also a culture in its 
own right, whose practices are internalised by board members, created by habitus and 
manifest of it. Through the recognition of signs and symbols, visual and verbal clues, 
individuals tend to act along pre-ordained lines laid down by habitus, which serve as an 
economising device or ‘shorthand’.   
Habitus is assumed most wholly when one is born to a particular environment: ‘to 
know is to be born with’ (‘connaître, c’est naître avec’). It follows that to be accepted by 
the elite as one of its own can only happen ‘by birth or by a slow process of co-option 
and initiation which is equivalent to a second birth’ (Bourdieu 1990a: 67-68). 
Newcomers who succeed in advancing their fortunes and legitimacy, of which we have 
highlighted several examples in this article, typically seek to embrace – at times 
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painstakingly, at others unawares – the social and cultural practices of the established 
elite into which they desire to become integrated. To gain acceptance requires that they 
display internalised behaviours that define them as boardroom material. This goes beyond 
a ‘state of mind’ to embrace a ‘state of the body’, to a greater or lesser degree of 
‘unawareness’, since, as Bourdieu puts it: ‘It is because agents never know completely 
what they are doing that what they do has more sense than they know’ (1990a: 67-69). 
For such newcomers, acceptance as authentic members of the business elite constitutes 
the ultimate prize.  
 The dominant culture of the US, according to Laird (2006), has sought to render 
class less visible, its principal manifestations attributed to individual achievement alone. 
The US prefers to see itself as a meritocracy, thereby overlooking the powerful part 
played by social capital, of which class is a key determinant. The former British Prime 
Minister, Margaret Thatcher, once famously said that there was ‘no such thing as society, 
only individuals’; and individual agency and responsibility undeniably play a critical role. 
Yet to credit individual agency without fully acknowledging social and family factors is 
tantamount to misrecognition (Bourdieu 1986a; 1996; Bubolz 2001). As Laird points out 
(2006), there is a sense in which self-made business success, stricto sensu, is ultimately 
impossible. The point to emphasise here is that, as our interview data suggests, actors are 
positioned in a ‘topography’ of social relations, occupying ‘positions of possibility’ 
which are not permanent, but which are instead reflective of underlying power relations 
determined by their particular allocation or acquisition of economic, social, cultural and 
symbolic capital (Anheier et al. 1995: 859; Bourdieu 1990a; Oakes et al. 1998: 260). 
Amongst these capital assets, connections and connectability, mentoring and networking, 
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arguably provide a sine qua non for individual advancement and admission into elite 
business groups.  
 This is not to imply, however, that we are headed for international convergence. 
As we have demonstrated, elite organisation and networking are still very different in 
both countries. Our research points overwhelmingly not to convergence, but rather to 
continuing diversity among national business systems, to the persistence of national 
distinctiveness and the strength of cultural reproduction. National business systems are, 
to a significant degree, self referring, supported and informed by pre-existing social 
structures, and possessing a coherence or cognitive similarity of organizing principles 
which restricts their capacity to adapt to new influences whilst not precluding change 
(Crouch 2005; Hall and Soskice 2001; Maclean and Harvey 2008; Schmidt 2003; 
Whitley 1999). In the context of the present article, our research has pointed, albeit 
tentatively, to British society being rather more open than French society. Opportunities 
for upward social mobility appear somewhat more in evidence in Britain than in France. 
While Britain is well known for extolling ‘blue blood’, and while France projects itself as 
a meritocracy, our research suggests that an individual’s chances of ascending the social 
ladder through a career in business may be higher in the former. 
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